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COMMENT

RAMONA MARTINEZ*

Recognition and Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards
Under the United Nations Convention
of 1958: The "Refusal" Provisions
Disagreements are as much a part of life as agreements. In the international
business context, however, disagreements not only cause corporate headaches, they
need fast, efficient, and effective settlement. International trade and investment are
seriously inhibited when disputes are not resolved promptly in a manner that reconciles the interests of both parties. 1 Litigation of disputes in the public forum of a
court can be costly, lengthy, and bitter, and may end in such animosity that it destroys
existing business relationships. 2 In addition, the complexity of international litigation
lacks the predictability that businesses desire; 3 differences in procedural and substantive law between national courts may cause unfairness to one of the parties. 4
to nonjudicial forums such as
Businesspersons, therefore, are turning increasingly
5
arbitration to settle their day-to-day disputes.
*J.D. Candidate, 1990, Southern Methodist University. Citation Editor, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
1. Rosenthal, A Businessman Looks at Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 27

(M. Domke ed. 1958).
2. Gardner, Economic and Political Implications of International Commercial Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 15, 16-17 (M. Dornke ed. 1958).

3. See generally Cole, The Public Policy Exception to the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, I J. DIsP. RES'N 365 (1986).
4. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051 (1961).
5. Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an InternationalDispute Settlement Technique,
in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3, 5-9 (T.

neau ed. 1984).
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Arbitration has many advantages .6 It sidesteps the problems of service of
process, finding legal representation qualified to practice in a foreign court, and
litigating in a foreign language. 7 From a practical viewpoint, businesspersons
prefer to have their disputes settled by someone with expertise in the field of the
dispute.8 By agreeing to the appointment of a mutually acceptable arbitrator,
knowledgeable and experienced in the area of the dispute, the parties can
9
anticipate a confidential, reasonable, and prompt settlement.
Effective international arbitration, however, is dependent on the parties'
success in enforcing arbitral awards. 10 The United States has enacted treaties
with foreign States to guarantee the international respect necessary for domestic
courts of various nations to enforce private foreign arbitral awards."1 These
2
treaties, however, have had a limited impact on the enforcement of the awards. t
The 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) 13 represents the culmination of efforts by many international organizations to secure a multilateral treaty
providing businesspersons with a unified, efficient, and trustworthy method of
insuring that the manner they have chosen to resolve their transnational disputes
will be effective. As the United States Supreme Court stated in a case involving
the enforcement of an international arbitration agreement:
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American adoption
and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of
commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards
by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the
signatory countries. 4

I. Arbitration in the International Business World
A.

PRE-NEW YORK CONVENTION

Common law rejected the value of arbitration and made clauses to arbitrate
revocable up until the time of the award. 15 Beginning some sixty years ago,

6. See generally Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 INT'L ARB. 1191
(1977).
7. Aksen, The Need to Utilize InternationalArbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 13 (1984).
8. R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW (3d ed. 1986).

9. Id.
10. Aksen, supra note 7, at 15; see also McClendon, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
in the United States, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 58 (1982); McLaughlin, Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards Under the New York Convention: Practice in U.S. Courts, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 275 (1988).

11. For a list of treaties the United States has adopted, see infra note 24.
12. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
13. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (effective in the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970).
14. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974).
15. Early common law declared that contracts to submit future disputes to arbitration were
revocable at any time prior to the issuance of an award. The agreements were considered against
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however, a number of states recognized the importance of arbitration as an
alternative to the judicial system and enacted legislation that rejected the
common law in an effort to afford businesspersons the arbitration for which they
had contracted. 16
The awakening of the value of arbitration received assistance from the
enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925.17 This Act provides for the
8
specific enforcement of arbitration agreements in the federal courts' and stay of
9
litigation instituted in defiance of the arbitration agreement.1 It authorizes
confirmation of the arbitral award by a federal court of the district in which the
award is rendered. 20 The scope of the Act is limited, 2' however, and the litigants
who desire to enlist the aid of the Federal Arbitration Act must satisfy all
requirements of federal jurisdiction.22
public policy on the theory that they were designed to deprive the courts of jurisdiction to hear and
determine controversies which would otherwise be within their cognizance. But see Burchell v. Marsh,
58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854), where the Supreme Court stated that "as a mode of settling disputes,
[arbitration) should receive every encouragement from courts of equity." For a history of arbitration
in the United States, see F. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948); Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928).
16. The New York Statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1980) first enacted
in 1956 as N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 1448-69, is the prototype. Other statutes enacted in the aid of arbitration
at the time were: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1511 (1982) (enacted in 1956); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1293 West (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-408 to -424 (1989) (enacted in
1958);FLA. STAT. § 57.01 to -.09 West (1969) (first enacted in 1957); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 188-1 to-15
(1985) (enacted in 1955); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-:4217 (West 1983) (enacted in 1950); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-49 (1980) (enacted in 1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 251, § 1-22
(Law. Co-op. 1985) (enacted in 1932); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 27.2483-.2505 (West 1977)

(enacted in 1943); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.01-.07 (West 1988) (enacted in 1947); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 542:1-:10 (1974) (enacted in 1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2a:24-1 to -11 (West 1987); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711:01-:15 (Anderson 1981)(enacted in 1954); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 33.210-.340
(1988) (enacted in 1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1-209 (Purdon 1975) (enacted in 1930); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 10-3-1 to -3-20 (1981) (enacted in 1956); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010-.220 (1971)
(enacted in 1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 298.01-. 18 (West 1986) (enacted in 1957). But see OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 216 (West 1966) (enacted in 1951).
17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) [hereinafter UN Convention & the Amended Federal Arbitration
Statute]. It was modeled on the New York State Arbitration law now contained in §§ 7501 to 7514
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. See generally Comment, InternationalCommercial
Arbitration Under the United Nations Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47
WASH. L. REV. 441 (1972); McMahon, Implementation of the UN Convention on ForeignArbitral
Awards in the U.S., 26 ARB. J. 65 (1971); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J.
1049 (1961).
18. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
19. Id. § 3.
20. Id. § 9.
21. The Act applies only if the arbitral agreement involves "commerce." The Act does not apply
to contracts of employment of workers engaged in foreign commerce. See Kochery, The Enforcement
of ArbitrationAgreements in the FederalCourts: Erie v. Thompkins, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 74 (1953).
The Act also has been construed as inapplicable to foreign awards. See McMahon, supra note 17.
Consequently, foreign awards could be enforced only by a common lawsuit on the award or on a
foreign judgment rendered on the award.
22. The Act does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, a party desiring to
invoke the Act must satisfy the jurisdictional amount of $10,000 and allege either diversity of
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Once the arbitration results in an award, the successful party desires to enforce
it with minimal procedural delay. Unfortunately, the Federal Arbitration Act is of
little use with regard to enforcement of a foreign award in a federal court. The
arbitral agreement must specify a court in which an order confirming the award
may be made. 23 The successful party is forced, if it uses the federal courts, to
bring a common law action upon the award, alleging some further basis of
federal jurisdiction. Thus, the summary enforcement procedure cannot be used in
seeking to enforce a foreign award in a federal court. Consequently, under the
Act, the machinery for dealing with enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is
highly deficient.
When it comes to international arbitration the United States has concentrated
its efforts on the development of bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation, which include provisions purporting to provide for judicial enforcement of international arbitration.2 4 These provisions are designed with limited
goals. Rather than giving positive assurance that American courts will enforce
foreign arbitration and recognize the awards from such arbitration, they simply
indicate that such arbitration will not be unenforceable merely because of the
presence of foreign elements. 25
citizenship or some other basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. E.g., Krauss Bros. Lumber Co.
v. Louis Bossert & Son Inc., 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933).
23. The language of the Act provides no basis for enforcement. It reads in part: "if no court is
specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States
Court in and for the district within such award was made." 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
24. The United States recognizes bilateral agreements between the United States and:
Ireland:
Sept. 14, 1950, I U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 269
Greece:
Oct. 13, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057, 224 U.N.T.S. 279
Israel:
April 3, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948, 217 U.N.T.S. 237
Italy:
March 8, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 4685
Denmark:
July 30, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 4797
Japan:
Oct. 30, 1953, 4 U.S.T.2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S. 143
Federal Republic
of Germany:
July 14, 1956, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3
Iran:
June 16, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93
Nicaragua:
May 24, 1958, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024
Netherlands:
Dec. 5, 1957, 8 U.S.T.2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942, 285 U.N.T.S. 231
Korea:
Nov. 7, 1957, 8 U.S.T.2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3942, 362 U.N.T.S. 231
Pakistan:
Feb. 12, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683
France:
Dec. 31, 1960, II U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625
Belgium:
Oct. 3, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432
Luxembourg:
March 28, 1963, 4 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306
Togo:
Feb. 8, 1966, 18 U.S.T. I
Thailand:
May 8, 1968, 9 U.S.T.5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540
25. A typical provision in such treaties is: "Contracts entered into between nationals and
companies of either Party and nationals and companies of the other Party, that provide for the
settlement by arbitration of controversies, shall not be deemed unenforceable within the territories of
such other Party merely on the grounds that the place designated for the arbitration proceedings is
outside such territories or that the nationality of one or more of the arbitrators is not such other Party.
No award duly rendered pursuant to such [arbitration] contract, and final and enforceable under the
laws of the place where rendered, shall be deemed invalid and denied effective means of enforcement
VOL. 24, NO. 2
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The United States is also a party to a multilateral treaty governing one form of
international arbitration: the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID). 26 The application of the
ICSID is limited in that it governs disputes arising from investments between a
government of one country and citizens of another country. 27 Furthermore, both
parties must agree in writing that the ICSID governs and that their disputes shall
28
be settled by the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
B.

HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION

The critical problem in international trade arbitration is to create a dependable
system of laws in all trading nations under which enforcement of awards is
obtained, regardless of the place of the hearing or the nationality of the
arbitrators. The New York Convention provides such a solution. 29 Due to an
obsolete misunderstanding of arbitration, the United States remained largely in
the background during the drafting of the Convention and the members of the
U.S. delegation to the United Nations recommended against signing the New
York Convention. 30 They advanced four principal reasons for their refusal to sign
the Convention: first, if the Convention were accepted in a manner that would
avoid conflict with state laws, it would offer no meaningful advantages to the
United States; second, if accepted in a manner that assured such advantages, it
would override the arbitration laws of a majority of the states; third, the United
States lacked a sufficient domestic legal basis for acceptance of the advanced
international convention dealing with this subject matter; and fourth, the
Convention embodied principles of arbitration law that the United States would

with the territories of either Party merely on the grounds that the place where such award was
rendered is outside the territories of such Party or that the nationality of one or more of the arbitrators
is not of such Party. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Feb. 8, 1966, United States-Togo, art.
III, para. 3, 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193 (1966). See UN Convention & the Amended Federal
Arbitration Statute, supra note 17, at 441.
26. Opened for signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 [hereinafter ICSID]. Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 854 F.2d 1314 (2d
Cir. 1987), marks the first time an ICSID award has received recognition in the U.S. courts. The
court blocked execution of the award, however, on the grounds of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976. The courts' restrictive approach to execution suggests that their recognition of the award
is unlikely to draw large numbers of future recognition of ICSID awards. See Recent Developments,
29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 135 (1988).
27. ICSID arts. 1(2) & 25.
28. ICSID arts. 25 & 26. See generally Coil, United States Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Against Sovereign States: Implications of the ICSID Convention, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 401 (1976).
29. The New York Convention supersedes the Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1927 (Geneva Convention), Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301. The Geneva Convention
applied to awards rendered under arbitral agreements meeting the requirements of Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158.
30. Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 3 INT'L LAW. 320 (1969).
SUMMER 1990
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not find desirable to endorse. 3 1 Not until 1970 did Congress recognize the
practical benefits of the New York Convention, 32 and adopt it by enacting chapter
two of the Federal Arbitration Act, which gives extremely broad effect to arbitral
remedies in most international transactions. 33 As a result, a party with an agreement to arbitrate an international commercial dispute to which the new enactment
applies can look to the federal courts and federal law for enforcement of an

31. The discussion of these and other matters are summarized in the Official Report of the United
States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration at 22.
See Aksen, American ArbitrationAccession Arrives in the Age ofAquarius: United States Implements
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards, 3 Sw.
U.L. REV. 1, 4 (1971).
32. Congress proposed this legislation thereby including the United States as a party to this
Convention because "the people engaged in foreign trade consider arbitration [as] a very economical
and speedy way to settle commercial disputes." S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
(testimony of Richard Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private
International Law, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations). "The debate on the floor of
the House of Representatives on July 6, 1970 reflects that Congress viewed this legislation as saving
the time of federal courts and promoting judicial economy." Fuller Co. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 421 F. Supp. 938, 947 (W.D. Pa. 1976). Congressman Andrew Jacobs of Indiana made
the following comment: "So far as the expense to the country generally is concerned, it is estimated
a great deal of money will be saved, because [the New York Convention] will make possible the use
of Federal courts here to order arbitration, rather than use of Federal courts here, which is the present
practice, to have full blown trial. This in net effect would save money." 116 CONG. REC. 22,731
(daily ed. July 24, 1970). Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York made the following statement:
"[lit is important to note that arbitration is generally a less costly method of resolving disputes than
is full-scale litigation in the courts. To the extent that arbitration agreements avoid litigation in the
courts, they produce savings not only with the parties to the agreement but also for the
taxpayers-who must bear the burden for maintaining our court system." 116 CONG. REc. 22,732-33
(daily ed. July 24, 1970). The President issued a proclamation on December 11, 1970, announcing
the United States accession to the Convention. In fact, one of the reasons the United States acceded
to the New York Convention was that the Convention had already been widely accepted throughout
the world; furthermore, American businesses were having trouble enforcing arbitral awards in some
countries which adhered to the reciprocity reservation of the Convention. See generally Aksen, supra
note 31; McMahon, supra note 17.
33. Chapter Two was the implementing legislation necessary to make the terms of the New York
Convention fit more easily into the framework of the American legal system. Act of July 31, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692, enacting 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. Section 201 on enforcement of the
Convention provides the general implementing language: "[t]he Convention on the recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in U.S. courts in
accordance with this chapter." Section 202 states that a commercial arbitration agreement or arbitral
award falls under the Convention, unless it arises out of a relationship entirely between U.S. citizens,
and that relationship does not involve property located abroad, or does not envisage performance or
enforcement abroad, or has no reasonable relationship with one or more foreign States. Section 203
grants original jurisdiction to district courts, regardless of the amount in controversy. Sections 204
and 205 discuss the district court's venue and the right to remove actions from state courts,
respectively. Under section 206 the court may order an arbitration held, in accordance with an
agreement, at any place within or outside the United States, and may appoint arbitrators in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. Section 207 provides for judicial confirmation of an
award, on the application of a party, except where the court finds the existence of one of the grounds
specified in the Convention for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of an award. Section
208 provides that the other chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act shall apply to actions brought
under the United Nations Convention when such chapters do not conflict with the Convention or the
implementing legislation.
VOL. 24, NO. 2
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agreement to arbitrate and for recognition of the award of the arbitrators, regardless of whether the arbitration is to take place in the United States or abroad.
The president of the United Nations Conference summarized the advantages of
the New York Convention over prior arbitration treaties as follows:
[I]t was already apparent that the document represented an improvement on the
Geneva Convention of 1927. It gave a wider definition of the awards to which the
Convention applied; it reduced and simplified the requirements with which the party
seeking recognition or enforcement of an award would have to comply; it placed the
burden of proof on the party against whom recognition or enforcement was invoked;
it gave the parties greater freedom in the choice of the arbitral authority and of the
arbitration procedures; it gave the authority before which the award was sought to be
the right to order the party opposing the enforcement to give suitable
relied upon
34
secuity.

Seventy-nine countries are now parties to the New York Convention. They
comprise all major 35countries of the Western world and all of the Eastern
European countries.
II. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Under the New York Convention
Despite the advantages of arbitration, it is valuable only to the extent that
parties can enforce an agreement to arbitrate and a resulting award against one
another. Absent some international agreement to recognize and enforce such an
award, international law does not impose such an obligation. 36 The New York
Convention provides the structure to enforce awards. The Convention allows the
direct enforcement of an award based on such an agreement by a judgment
obtained in the court of any contracting State, subject to review by that court, not
on the merits, but on grounds of fairness, nonarbitrability, public policy, and due
process. One wishing to enforce an award in the United States under the New
York Convention need only supply the authenticated original award or a certified

34. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.25, at 2 (1958).
35. The following countries are parties to the New York Convention: Algeria, Antigua and
Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Empire-Republic of, Chile, ChinaPeoples Republic of, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Djibouti,
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany-Federal Republic of,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland-Republic of,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kampuchea-Democratic, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania-United Republic of, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United
States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia. See generally XIV YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
457 (1989) [hereinafter Y.B. CoM. ARB.]
36. Supra note 25 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 17, at 443-47.
SUMMER 1990
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copy, the original or certified copy of the arbitration agreement, and official or
sworn translations, if appropriate, 37 within three years after the award. 3 s
Whether the award is the result of an institutional or ad hoc arbitration is
immaterial. 39 United States district courts have original jurisdiction to hear
41
4
applications to confirm or challenge awards, 0 which are tried as motions
without a jury.42 The court may require the deposit of security if the award is
challenged,4 3 and a judgment of confirmation has the same force and may be
enforced as a judgment in an action.4 4
The principal features and obligations of the New York Convention are set
forth in articles I through VI. 45 Article I establishes the limitations of the treaty's
scope. The treaty applies only to foreign (international) commercial agreements
to arbitrate. 46 Article I also permits States to limit their obligation to enforce
awards to only those made in reciprocating nations. 47 Article I provides that the
arbitration clause must be in writing and requires the subject matter to be capable
of arbitration. 48 Article III requires each contracting State to recognize and
37. See infra notes 60 & 61 and accompanying text (article IV provision on proving the award).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) provides "[wlithin three years after an arbitral award falling under
the Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under
this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration."
39. New York Convention, article 1(2), states "[t]he 'arbitral award' shall include not only
awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies
to which the parties have submitted." New York Convention, supra note 13, art. 1(2). Institutional
arbitration allows a party to choose the rules of a particular organization experienced in administering
arbitration, whereas, ad hoc arbitration requires the parties to agree on their own set of rules at the
time of contract negotiations. See generally Rhodes & Sloan, The Pitfalls of International
Commercial Arbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (1984).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1976) provides "a[n] action or proceeding falling under the Convention
shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the
United States . . . shall have original jurisdiction over such action or proceeding, regardless of the
amount in controversy."
41. 9 U.S.C. § 6 (1982).
42. See Audi-NSU Auto Union A.G. v. Overseas Motors Ind., III Y.B. COM. ARB. 291, 292
(1978).
43. "If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to the
competent authority referred to in article V paragraph (1)(e), the authority before which the award is
sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decisions on the enforcement of
the awards and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order
the other party to give suitable security." New York Convention, supra note 13, art. VI.
44. 9 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
45. New York Convention, supra note 13.
46. New York Convention, article I(1), provides "[t]his Convention shall apply to the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State
where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences
between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered
domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought," New York
Convention, supra note 13, art. I(l).
47. Id. art. 1(3). This limitation does not mean that a nation will not recognize an award made
in a State which has not ratified the Convention, but only that it may refuse to apply the provisions
of the Convention in its recognition of the award.
48. Id. art. It.
VOL. 24, NO. 2
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enforce arbitral awards fairly. 49 Article IV provides that a party may obtain
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award merely by supplying a certified
copy of the contract containing the agreement to arbitrate and a certified copy of
the arbitrator's award. 50 Article V recognizes only seven grounds for refusing
enforcement of an arbitral award. 5' Article V(1) 5 2 details the allowable defenses
that may be raised by the parties to the recognition and enforcement of the award
while article V(2) 5 3 states the grounds on which the court itself may deny
enforcement. Article V154 permits the court either to accept an article V reason
to deny enforcement of the award or to accept the argument of the party seeking
of the award and require security on the award from the opposing
enforcement
55
party.

A.

ARTICLE Ill-THE BASIC OBLIGATION

Article III of the New York Convention contains the fundamental obligation of
a contracting State to recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied
on and under the conditions set forth in the Convention. 56 The forum State must
not impose "substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges" on
49. Id. art. III; see also infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
50. Id. art. IV; see also infra notes 60 & 61 and accompanying text.
51. Id. art. V; see infra notes 62-252 and accompanying text for a full analysis of the refusal
provisions.
52. Id. The allowable defenses include: the absence of a valid agreement; lack of fair opportunity
to be heard; the award exceeds the scope of the agreement; improper composition or procedure of the
arbitral tribunal; and the award is not binding or has been set aside.
53. Id. The grounds on which the court may deny enforcement are that either the subject matter
of the dispute is not arbitrable or recognition of the award would violate the enforcing country's
public policy.
54. Id. art. VI; see supra note 43 (specific language of article VI).
55. Article VII states that the New York Convention shall not affect the validity of other
agreements entered into by the contracting States, except that the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927
shall cease to have effect on contracting States. Articles VIII, IX, and X address the procedure of
accession to the Convention. Article XI details the applicability of the Convention to a federal or
nonunitary State. Articles XII and XIII specify when the New York Convention comes into force or
may be terminated in regard to specific States. Article XIV limits the use of the New York
Convention by a contracting State against other contracting States to the extent the State is bound by
the Convention. Article XV stipulates for the Secretary General of the United Nations to notify the
contracting States of the status of the other contracting States. Finally, Article XVI states that the
Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of the Convention are all equally authentic, and
that the Secretary General of the United Nations shall transmit a certified copy of the Convention to
the contracting States. See generally Aksen, supra note 31.
56. New York Convention, article III, provides that -[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall
not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition
or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards." New York Convention, supra note 13, art. III.
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the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which the Convention applies
than it imposes on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. 57
The New York Convention thus remits the parties to domestic laws already in place
with respect to enforcing awards. If domestic awards are hard to enforce,
the New
58
York Convention does not make foreign awards easier to enforce.
The lack of a uniform system of international procedural rules of enforcement
for foreign awards is one of the biggest drawbacks of the New York Convention.
In light of the various views about arbitration, the achievement of uniformity is
a lofty goal. The contracting States have been left free to establish different
procedures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards and domestic
awards within the limits of the "substantially more onerous conditions" rule. 59
B.

ARTICLE IV-PROVING THE AWARD

The New York Convention places the burden of proving the invalidity of the
award on the defendant. The proponent of the award is required to: (1) file an
application for recognition and enforcement of the award with the competent
authority in the contracting State; (2) supply the duly authenticated original

award or a duly certified copy; (3) supply the original arbitration agreement or a
duly certified copy; and (4) supply, if appropriate, a translation of the award and
agreement, which may be certified by an official or a sworn translator or by a
diplomatic or consular agent. 60 This establishes a prima facie case and the burden
shifts to the defendant to establish
the invalidity of the award on one of the
61
grounds specified in article V.
C.

ARTICLE V-GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL

United States courts recognize article V of the New York Convention as the
exclusive source of their authority to deny enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award.62 This recognition is consistent with the Convention's implementing
legislation, which states that a "court shall confirm the award unless it finds one
of the grounds specified in the said Convention." 63 The U.S. judicial interpre-

57. Id.
58. There are no rules promulgated for conducting arbitration, there are no tribunals established
for enforcing awards and there are no procedural standards created for the enforcement of awards.
The New York Convention directs the parties to the rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied on. See Quigley, Convention on ForeignArbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A. J. 821 (1972).

59. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. III.
60. Id. art. IV.
61. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socidtd Generale de L'lndustrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
62. Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
See also Parsons& Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 977.

63. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1976).
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tation of the Convention places the burden of proving the nonenforceability 64of
States.
the award on the party seeking to prevent enforcement in the United
Article V lists five grounds the defendant may assert to argue for denial of the
recognition and enforcement of the award and two further grounds upon which
the competent authority of the forum State may, on its own motion, refuse
recognition or enforcement. 65 The courts favor granting recognition and enforcement whenever possible. In general, the courts favor international commercial
arbitration 66 and recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention is
seldom refused. 67 The overall scheme of the Convention is to facilitate
enforcement of arbitral awards. Nonetheless, it is vitally important that parties,
seeking enforcement and nonenforcement alike, have a clear understanding of
the grounds for denial of recognition. The operation of each specific refusal
provision is, therefore, considered below.
1. Article V(1)(a): The Absence
of a Valid Arbitration Agreement
[Tihe parties to the agreement referred to in article I were, under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which
any indication thereon, under the law of the
the parties have subjected it or, failing
68
country where the award was made.
The first ground for nonrecognition is the absence of a valid arbitration
agreement. A court should not enforce an award against a party that never agreed
to arbitrate. This defect may involve a determination of several items: whether
there was an agreement; whether there was an agreement to be bound by the
arbitrator's decision, or merely to submit the dispute to an umpire; or whether the
agreement was valid (e.g., whether it was illegal or induced by fraud or duress).
A party may claim that a particular party did not have the capacity to make the
69
arbitration agreement or that the agreement was invalid under applicable law.
No reported U.S. judicial decision, however, has vacated an arbitral award

64. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 973; Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. BaruchFoster Corp., 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976). Some suggest that this burden discourages contesting
enforcement of the award. See Note, The Validity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Defense in Suits
Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 FORDHAM
INT'L

L.J. 321, 332 (1983-84).

65. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V. The party defending the enforcement action
has the burden of proof and must raise the procedural defect. See Imperial Ethiopian Gov't, 535 F.2d
at 336; Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 973.
66. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). The Court, referring to the New
York Convention, stated that the goal of this Convention is to encourage the recognition and
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts.
67. See generally Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAw. 269 (1979).
68. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(I)(a).
69. McClendon, supra note 10, at 63.
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because of either lack of capacity of one or both of the contracting
parties or
70
invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate under the applicable law.
The Convention allows the enforcing State to examine the validity of the
agreement, but only under the law selected by the parties or the law of the place
of arbitration. 7 1 The law applicable to the parties is used to judge the capacity of
the parties to the contract. The court remains free to utilize its own conflict of
laws principles in arriving at the law governing the capacity of the parties. The
article V(1)(a) defense distinguishes between the law under which a court should
examine the capacity of the parties ("law applicable to them") and the law under
which a court should examine the validity of the agreement ("the law to which
the parties have subjected [the agreement] or, failing any indication . . ., under
the law of the country where the award was made"). 72 In the former situation,
a court may apply its conflict of laws rules to determine the applicable law. 7 3 In
the latter case, the parties are bound by the law they have selected (either
expressly or by default). 74
This provision contains no requirement that the agreement be in writing. It
seems difficult, however, to see how the proponent could supply the enforcing
State with a copy of the agreement, as required by article IV, unless it were in
writing. For the same reason, it also appears that the parties' choice of law must
be in the agreement itself.
Litigation of an article V(l)(a) defense has not been reported in any U.S.
court. 75 The validity of this defense, however, has been restrictively defined by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturer.76 In Prima Paint the Court held that the validity of the
contract was itself a matter for the arbitrator to decide. 77 The judiciary should
base its decision regarding arbitrability upon an examination of the arbitration
clause only, and not the entire contract. 78 It is hard to imagine a case, however,
in which one would have proof of the invalidity of the clause itself without proof
70. See generally I-XIV Y.B. COM. ARB. (International Council for Commercial Arbitration)
(cumulative summary of all cases involving the New York Convention).
71. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(a).

72. Id.
73. Cf. In Re Ferrara S.p.A.v. United Grain Growers, Ltd., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd without op., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (United States law rather than Italian law governed
the court's construction of the underlying contract containing the arbitration clause).
74. The parties can expressly identify what law will govern; otherwise by default, the law of the
territory of the arbitration governs. See generally Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517
F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981), for a case in which the failure to select a specific law may have
worked to the prejudice of the party which prevailed at the arbitration.
75. See generally [1987] XII Y.B. COM. ARB. KEY (International Council for Commercial
Arbitration). If the parties fail to specify their choice of law within the agreement then the parties will
be bound by the law of the territory of the arbitration. New York Convention, supra note 13, art.
V(l)(a).
76. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
77. Id. at 403-04.
78. Id.
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of the invalidity of the entire contract. 79 Since incapacity of the parties would
contract, pursuit of this
seem to bring into question the validity of the entire
80
defense was impliedly discouraged in Prima Paint.
2. Article V(J)(b): Lack of Fair Opportunity to be Heard
[T]he party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the 8arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case. '

The second ground incorporates a basic notion of due process into the New
York Convention. Enforcement of an arbitral award may be denied if the party
was not given proper notice of either the appointment of the arbitrator or the
proceeding, or if the party was unable to present his case. 82 The word "proper"
was adopted to take care of the situation where the defendant was under some
legal incapacity. 83 The phrase "or was otherwise unable to present his case" was
needed to deal with the circumstances where force majeure or other causes
operated to prevent a party from presenting his case or where he was not given
adequate opportunity to do So.84 Although the clause contains no criteria upon
which to gauge the adequacy of the notice, this defense "essentially sanctions
the application of the forum State's standard of due process." 85 There is,
however, a remote chance that a court may analogize to the previous clause of
the New York Convention, which states that the question of validity of the
agreement is determined under the law the parties have selected, or, failing any
selection, under the law of the place of arbitration. The due process exception,
like other article V defenses to enforcement of arbitral awards, has been narrowly

79. After Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395, the courts have consistently upheld the validity of
arbitration agreements. While the following cases were not litigated under the Convention, the
arguments asserted demonstrate what the court will accept or reject in considering the validity of any
arbitration agreement. The courts have rejected the following arguments favoring the invalidity of
arbitration agreements: the cause of action arose prior to the agreement to arbitrate and therefore
could not have been covered by it, see Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); the contract provided expressly for various types of judicial relief,
see Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); the claims being
pressed to arbitrate are frivolous, see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 501 F.2d
423 (8th Cir. 1974). The defenses that the courts have acknowledged include: the specific agreement
for arbitration was procured by fraud, see Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67
Cal. App. 3d 19, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1977); there was never an arbitration agreement embodied in
a written contract, see Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
80. See generally Note, The Express Defenses of the N.Y Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 103 (1983).
81. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(l)(b).
82. Id.
83. U.N. Doc. No. E/CONF. 26/SR. 17, at 9, 14 (1958).
84. U.N. Doc. No. E/CONF. 26/SR.23, at 15 (1958).
85. See Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 975. This statement concisely phrases the object of
the V(l)(b) defense. It concerns the fundamental principle of procedures, that of a fair hearing and
adversary proceedings.
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construed. The U.S. courts generally look at the overall result (whether the
defendant got a fair hearing) and do not overturn awards because the defendant
was unable to present some part of his case, such as a witness, 86 or could not
cross-examine the other party's witness. 87 Nor can the defendant complain if he
had notice of the hearing and failed to attend. 88
In Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA) 89 the Second Circuit rejected the defense put forward by the
American company that the arbitrators had violated standards of due process by
refusing to postpone a hearing because one of the witnesses could not be present
due to a prior commitment to lecture at an American university. 90 The court
found that the refusal did not infringe Parsons & Whittemore's due process rights
under the United States Constitution. 9 1 A speaking engagement did not justify
the rearrangement of an international arbitration, according to the court:
arbitrators have a strong interest in adhering to a schedule set on the basis of
92
convenience "to parties, counsel and arbitrators scattered about the globe."
Also, "inability to produce one's witnesses before an arbitral tribunal is a risk
inherent in an agreement to submit to arbitration." 93 The court stated that when
a party agrees to arbitrate, it may be agreeing to forgo some of the advantages
of litigation, such as compulsory process. 94 Since the witness provided the
arbitrators with an affidavit covering most of his proposed testimony, Parsons &
Whittemore could not claim that the matter was decided without considering the
witness's particular evidence of its defense. 95 The court held that the arbitrators
acted within their power in refusing to delay the proceedings.
In Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical
Instrument Co. 96 the party seeking to block enforcement of the award claimed it
was "unable to present its case" under article V(1)(b), because its rights and
liabilities under the disputed agreement had not matured. The party opposing
enforcement argued that because legal rights under the agreement between the

86. Id.
87. See Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063,
1067 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
88. See Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co.,

415 F. Supp. 133, 137 (D.N.J. 1976), where the court said that -[m]ost have held that an arbitration
award is not fraudulently obtained within the meaning of [9 U.S.C.] § 10(a) ... when the protesting
party had an opportunity to rebut his opponent's claims at the arbitration hearing."
89. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); see infra note 180- 86 and accompanying text (full description
of the facts).
90. 508 F.2d at 975.
91. Id. at 975-76.
92. Id. at 975.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 976.
96. 415 F. Supp. 133, 140 (D.N.J. 1976).
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parties were not yet fully determinable, 97 its adversary's commencement of
arbitration was premature and the party opposing enforcement was therefore
unable to present its case. 98 The court held that this argument misconstrued the
intent of the due process exception, which primarily guarantees notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 99 Neither of these protections was impaired in the case,
and therefore article V(1)(b) did not bar enforcement of the award.' 0 0
In Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableriesde Lens, S.A. (LTCL) v. Southwire Co. 101
Southwire contended that it was prevented from offering certain pertinent
evidence at the arbitral hearing. 102 The court ultimately concluded that "arbitrators are charged with the duty of determining what evidence is relevant and
what is irrelevant and that absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the court
will not vacate an award based on improper evidence or the lack of proper
evidence." 10 3 Therefore, the court held that Southwire was not denied a fair
hearing, and refused to deny the award in reliance upon this defense. 104
3. Article V(1)(c): The Award or a Nonseverable
Part of it Exceeds the Submission to Arbitration
[T]he award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not submitted, that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and
enforced. 05

The third ground is really a restatement of the principle of article V(1)(a). An
award should not be enforced against a party that never agreed to arbitrate the
subject matter. Further, an award should not be enforced when it deals with
matters not submitted or beyond the scope of the submission and these decisions
cannot be separated from the rest of the award. An award rendered on a dispute
97. Medford conceded liability under the agreement that was the subject of arbitration but
alleged that it had a right to offset this liability by commissions that it earned under a separate
agreement. Id. at 135-36.
98. Id. at 140.
99. InFerrara S.p.A. v. United Grain Growers, Ltd., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd
without op., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), a case not directly applying the New York Convention,
the court addresses an allegation that an award is invalid because the demand for arbitration was
improperly served. The court recognized that notice had been mailed to a given address; therefore,
there was no merit to the claim of improper notice.
100. Biotronik, 415 F. Supp at 140-41.
101. 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980); see infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text (full
description of the facts).
102. Id. at 1066. Southwire argued that its attorney was prevented from fully cross-examining
LTCL's international projects manager with regard to a renegotiation clause in the contract.
103. Id. at 1067.
104. Id.
105. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(I)(c).
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not within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate may be refused recognition and
enforcement. The language shows a bias in favor of enforcement, however, by
permitting the court to enforce a severable part of an award. The portions of the
award dealing with disputes within the scope of the submission may be
recognized and enforced if they are severable. 106 The New York Convention,
however, once again fails to specify what law would govern severability. The
best approach would be to square the provision with article V(1)(a) by looking
to the law chosen by the parties or, absent such choice, to the law of the State
where the award was made.
The Parsons & Whittemore10 7 court provided the most comprehensive interpretation of the defense: "This defense to enforcement of a foreign award, like the
others already discussed, should be construed narrowly. Once again a narrow
construction would comport with the enforcement-facilitating thrust of the
Convention." lo The Parsons & Whittemore court read article V(1)(c) very
narrowly and enforced the arbitrator's award for loss of production even though
the contract stated that "neither party shall have any liability for loss of
production." '0 9 The court determined that so long as it could reasonably believe
that the arbitration panel had not ignored that provision, but had simply not
interpreted it to deny its own jurisdiction, it was not necessary for the court and
the arbitrators to agree on a contract interpretation. 11o In denying the defense, the
court characterized other challenges to the damages awarded as "attempts to
secure a reconstruction . . . of the contract-an activity wholly inconsistent with
the deference due arbitral decisions on law and fact.""'
A similar situation arose in Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management,
Inc., " 2 in which the arbitrators awarded consequential damages even though the
parties' contract excluded such liability.' 3 After Parsons & Whittemore, the
district court in Fertilizer Corp., even if so inclined, would have had difficulty
vacating the award. The opinion of the arbitral panel in Fertilizer Corp., a
"speaking award" in which the arbitrator's reasoning is stated, made specific
reference to the liability exclusion in the contract, thus establishing beyond doubt
that the panel was not ignoring the provision as required by Parsons &
Whittemore. 114 The Fertilizer Corp. court, acting under the narrow judicial
review of arbitral awards granted to an American court, may not substitute its
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.

Id.
508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); see infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (facts of the case).
508 F.2d at 976.
Id.
Id. at 976-77.
Id. at976.
517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.Ohio 1981).
113. Id. at 958.
114. Id. at 960. When arbitrators explain their conclusion "in terms that offer even a barely
colorable justification for the outcome reached, confirmation of the award cannot be prevented by
litigants who merely argue .. .for a different result."
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judgment for that of the arbitrators. 115 The court found no action beyond the
scope of the arbitrator's authority and affirmed the award. 116
4. Article V(J)(d): Improper Composition
or Procedureof the Arbitral Tribunal
[T]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.' 7
If the arbitral panel was not selected in accordance with the arbitration
agreement or if not covered by the agreement with the law of the State where the
arbitration was held, or if the arbitration procedure was not in accord with the
terms of the agreement, enforcement may be denied. This clause is subject to
conflicting interpretations. ' 18 Because procedure must be in accord merely with
the law to which the parties agree, the argument can be made that it need not be
in accord with any preexisting institutionalized arbitration procedures. This view
seeks delocalized arbitration, which need not be based upon the law of any
country. This interpretation follows logically from the language of the
provision.' 19 Conversely, the provision can be construed as being restricted to
the law of a particular country. The U.S. courts have held in favor of the latter
interpretation, insofar as the parties agree to procedures that do not tamper with
basic due process notions.
The U.S. courts have addressed the question of the improper composition of
the arbitral tribunal twice. First, the losing party in one arbitration relied on this
defense to challenge the award in Imperial Ethiopian Government v. BaruchFoster Corp.120 After the arbitration panel made the award, the losing party,
Baruch-Foster, discovered that the third arbitrator had previously drafted the
Civil Code for the Ethiopian Government, the prevailing party. 121 Baruch-Foster
claimed the selection violated the arbitration agreement, which provided that the
third arbitrator should have no direct or indirect connection with either party. The
district court confirmed enforcement of the award, finding that Baruch-Foster had
waived any objection to the composition of the panel. 122 Baruch-Foster,

115. Id.
116. Id. at 959.
117.

New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(I)(d).

118. This section is the product of a compromise between antagonistic negotiating forces. One
group argued for "complete subjection of the arbitral procedure to the law of the country where the
award was made," the other advocated "contractual freedom to designate an arbitral procedure
independent of the law of any country." Quigley, supra note 4, at 1068-69.
119. See, e.g., Cremades, The Impact of International Arbitration on the Development of
Business Law, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 526 (1983).

120. 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 335. It was conceded that the arbitrator was a member of the committee that drafted
the civil code for Ethiopia.
122. Id. at 336.
SUMMER 1990

504

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

however, appealed and claimed that the district court erred in denying the motion
for discovery directed at the alleged connection between the third arbitrator and
the Ethiopian government. The court of appeals affirmed enforcement of the
award on the grounds that Baruch-Foster's allegations were unsubstantiated and
that the district court correctly denied any discovery on the issue.' 23
Second, in Al HaddadBros. Enterprises v. MIS Agapi 124 Al Haddad invoked
the article V(1)(d) defense. 125 In particular, the arbitration provision called for
an arbitration panel composed of one arbitrator appointed by each party, and if
two arbitrators did not agree, an umpire appointed by the two arbitrators would
render the decision. 126 The award was made by a sole arbitrator. 127 Regardless,
the court reasoned that the fact that the award was not rendered in accordance
with the parties' agreement was not fatal. 1 28 The Convention allows recognition
of an award that complies with the laws of the country where the arbitration
occurred. 129 Under British law a sole arbitrator may decide a dispute; therefore,
30
the award was not invalidated by the defense.'
5. Article V(J)(e): The Award Is Not Binding
or Has Been Set Aside or Suspended
[T]he award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
the award was made. 131

This clause contains two grounds for refusal: (1) the award has not yet become
binding; or (2) the award has been set aside or suspended by the court of the
country where the award was made. To be enforceable, the award, according to
the law under which it was made, must be binding on the parties, and it must not
have been set aside or suspended. The provision was a response to concerns that
the award should not be given binding effect in one country when it is not binding
under the law where it was made. 132 The countervailing consideration was the
desirability of avoiding the "double exequatur," which requires judicial recognition of the award in both the rendering State and in the State in which
enforcement is sought. 133
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 337. The Fifth Circuit declined to adopt the district court's waiver theory.
635 F. Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1986), aff'd without op., 813 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1987).
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(l)(d).
Al Haddad, 635 F. Supp. at 209.
Id.
Id.at 210.

129. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(l)(d).

130. Al Haddad, 635 F. Supp. at 210.
131. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(l)(e).
132. See Quigley, supra note 4, at 1069.
133. See generally Note, The Express Defenses of the N.Y Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 103 (1983).
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No one wanted the New York Convention to require judicial proceedings in
confirmation of the award in both the rendering and enforcing States. 13 4 At the
same time, an award that has been set aside by competent authority in the State
where rendered should hardly be granted enforcement in another State. The
hardest question is the status, in the enforcing State, of an award that is still
subject to review in the rendering State by appeal or other procedures. The
determination of when an award is "binding" causes difficulties since the New
York Convention fails to define the term. Different bases for enforcement have
different standards governing when an award is binding. Under the 1927 Geneva
Convention,1 35 which the New York Convention superseded, 136 the award had to
be "final" in the country where made in order to be enforceable abroad. The
usual commercial treaty language is "final and enforceable." 137 Either "final"
or "enforceable" can cause interpretation problems. "Final" implies completion of all permitted appeals. "Enforceable" means some kind of court action,
because arbitral awards are not self-executing. 138 It was to avoid this problem
that the language "binding on the parties" is used in the New York Convention
39
instead of "final" or "enforceable." 1
The defense was raised by IDI in Fertilizer Corp. v. IDI. 140 IDI argued that
since the case was under appeal in an Indian court, the award could not be
considered binding in the United States. 4 ' The U.S. district court rejected this
argument and found that a pending court appeal did not alter the "binding"
effect of the award for the purposes of the New York Convention. 142 Under the
43
Convention, "binding" means that no further arbitral appeals are available. 1
The fact that recourse may be had to a court of law does not prevent the award
from having binding effect. 4" Were it to hold otherwise, the court would be
validating a means by which a losing party could evade enforcement of an
134. Quigley, supra note 4, at 1069.
135. Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 92 L.N.T.S. 301 (1927).
136. New York Convention, art. VII (2), provides: "[tihe Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses
of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 shall cease
to have effect between Contracting States on their becoming bound and to the extent that they become
bound, by this Convention." New York Convention, supra note 13, art. VII(2).
137. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations U.S.-Togo, supra note 25.
138. See generally McClendon, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 4
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 58 (1982).
139. See Sanders, supra note 67; Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational
Commercial Arbitration, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 236 (1981).
140. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
141. Id. at 955. The award was being reviewed by an Indian court to determine whether the
arbitrators could properly award consequential damages when the contract expressly provided
otherwise.
142. Id. at 956-57. "An award is entitled to the respect which is due to judgments of a court of
last resort."
143. McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 300.
144. Id.
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award by bringing, in a foreign court, a postarbitral action to set the award
aside. 145
Article VI sheds some light on Fertilizer's finding regarding the "binding"
effect of an award. 146 That provision was drafted to improve upon the Geneva
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927,147 which
provides that an award would not be considered binding if an appeal was pending
in the rendering country. 148 Article VI provides that a pending appeal only
allows, and does not compel, the court to adjourn its decision. 149 The article also
allows the court in the enforcing State to require suitable security from the party
opposing enforcement of the awards as a condition to such enforcement. 150 The
decision to set aside or suspend the award is based on an ad hoc determination
by the court, guided by the proenforcement attitude of the New York
Convention.'51
6. Article V(2)(a): Subject Matter Not Arbitrable
[T]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of that country. 152
This ground, like the following ground, may be raised by the enforcing court
on its own accord. 1 53 This clause carries over the similar provision in article
(1)(b) of the Geneva Convention. 154 The enforcing State is empowered to decide
the "arbitrability" of the dispute under its local standards.' 55 If the grounds of
a dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under the domestic law of the enforcing
State, a court may refuse to enforce an award granted through a foreign
arbitration panel.
In Parsons & Whittemore, ' 56 the defendants asserted the nonarbitrability
defense. The argument was premised on the fact that the dispute had a significant
impact on U.S. foreign policy.' 57 Therefore, the defendants argued, the dispute
could not "be placed at the mercy of foreign arbitrators 'who are charged with
145. Fertilizer Corp., 517 F. Supp. at 958 (quoting Aksen, supra note 31, at 11).
146. New York Convention, supra note 13; see also supra note 43 (for the specific language).
147. See Geneva Convention, supra note 29.
148. Id. art. i(d).
149. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. VI.
150. Id.
151. Fertilizer Corp., 517 F. Supp. at 961.
152. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(2)(a).
153. Id. at art. V(2).
154. Article 1(b) of the Geneva Convention provides: "To obtain such recognition or enforcement, it shall, further be necessary: ... (b) That the subject-matter of the award is capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of the country in which the award is sought tobe relied upon."
The text of the Geneva Convention is reprinted in 3 G. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
2153-60 (1931).
155. Quigley, supra note 4, at 1070.
156. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 969; see infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (full
description of the facts).
157. 508 F.2d at 975.
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58
the execution of no public trust' and whose loyalties are to foreign interests."
The court concluded that the mere fact that an issue of national interest may
incidentally figure into the resolution of a breach of contract claim does not
render the dispute nonarbitrable.' 59 Simply because acts of the United States are
somehow implicated in a case, one cannot conclude that the United States is
vitally interested in its outcome.160 In analyzing the national interest, the court
noted that the Supreme Court's decision in favor of arbitrability in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 161a case far more prominently displaying public features
than the instant one, compels, by analogy, the conclusion that the foreign award
62
against Parsons & Whittemore dealt with a subject arbitrable under U.S. law. 1
The defense, however, was successfully invoked to deny enforcement of an
arbitral award against Libya in Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya63 [hereinafter LIAMCO]. In 1973-1974
Libya nationalized LIAMCO's rights under petroleum concessions that it had
granted nearly twenty years before. Dissatisfied with the compensation for its
interest and equipment, LIAMCO pursued arbitration as provided in the
agreement. An award was rendered in Geneva in LIAMCO's favor. When
LIAMCO tried to enforce the award in the United States, Libya opposed it by
claiming sovereign immunity' 64 and alternatively by claiming that nationalization was not subject to arbitration.
The court denied Libya's sovereign immunity claim on the grounds that by
agreeing to arbitration governed by foreign law, Libya waived its sovereign
immunity. 165 In the second defense, the court interpreted the "subject matter of
the differences" in the case as Libya's nationalization of LIAMCO's assets and
the rate at which LIAMCO should be compensated for the assets taken under the
nationalization. 166 The court accepted Libya's argument that the subject matter
in dispute was the oil concession nationalization, an act of state, and that

158. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellant at 23).
159. Id. at 975.
160. Id.
161. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). See infra notes 193-200 and
accompanying text. The United States had a national interest in denying arbitration for claims based
on alleged Securities Act violations. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In the international
context, the court must subordinate domestic interest in light of policy considerations underlying
international agreements.
162. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 975.
163. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated without op., 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter LIAMCO].
164. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1975, codified at28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(f), 1441(d) and 1602-1611 (1975).
165. LIAMCO, 484 F. Supp. at 1178; see also Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
465 F. Supp. 824 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (an action for enforcement of an arbitral award based on breach
of contract, the court held that the foreign sovereign's "agreement to adjudicate all disputes arising
under the contract in accordance with Swiss law and by the arbitration under ICC rules constitute[d]
a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act." 465 F. Supp. at 826).
166. LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp. at 1178.
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nationalization laws abrogated all terms of the concession.'

67

The court reasoned

that since it could not have compelled arbitration in this instance, because
arbitration would necessarily review the validity of the nationalization and thus
violate the act of state doctrine, it could not enforce the award. 168 LIAMCO
appealed the district court's decision, but before the appeal was decided, the
parties settled, and the appeal was dismissed. 169
The defense of nonarbitrable subject matter is unique in that it has met with
some success in the U.S. courts. The defense, however, may be limited to a few
areas, such as nationalization decrees. As Scherk demonstrates, 170 U.S. courts
have recognized and enforced arbitral awards arising out of a type of dispute that
would not be arbitrable under national law. Although traditionally nonarbitrable
under U.S. law, disputes over patent rights are now arbitrable under congres-

sional legislation.

171Similarly,

agreements to arbitrate alleged violations of U.S.

racketeering laws arising from international transactions will be enforced under
72
the New York Convention.'
7. Article V(2)(b): The Public Policy of the Forum
[T]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy
of that country. 173

The final express defense of article V has been the most frequently litigated.
This clause has the effect of relegating the ultimate decision on the efficacy of the
New York Convention to the good faith of the contract States. 174 The legislative
history of the provision offers no certain guidelines to its construction. Basically,
if the judge finds that the recognition and enforcement of the foreign award
would be contrary to the public policy of his country, the judge may refuse
recognition and enforcement.' 75 Unfortunately, a broad interpretation of the
public policy defense undermines the strength and effectiveness of the New York
Convention, and in turn casts doubt on the effectiveness of international
arbitration. 176 The United Nations committee that prepared the draft convention

167. Id.at 1179.
168. Id.at 1178-79.
169. LIAMCO, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C.Cir.1981).
170. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
171. Patent Law Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 105, 98 Stat.
3383-85 (1984)
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 135).
172. Development Bank of thePhilippines v. Chemtex Fibers Inc., 617 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.1985)
(alleged civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act [RICO] predicated on
Chemtex's alleged fraudulent use of the mails and international telephones and telex facilities).
173. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(2)(b).
174. Quigley, supra note 4, at 1070.
175. "To say that public policy prohibits arbitration in a particular instance explains little: 'public
policy' is a catch phrase elusive of meaning without reference to the context in which it is used."
Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2

CARDozo L. REV. 481 (1981), discusses the public policy defense.
176. See Note, The Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral

Awards, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 228, 228-29 n. I (1977), which states that the "public policy defense
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indicated in its report to the U.N. Conference that its intention is to limit the
application of the public policy exception "to cases in which the recognition or
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award would be distinctly contrary to the basic
77
principles of the legal system of the country where the award was invoked." 1
The U.S. courts have upheld this limitation and only allowed the defense where
recognition and enforcement of the award would violate the "most basic notions
of morality and justice." 178 Although this defense is often asserted, it is rarely
successful. 179 There is an international public policy, as well as a domestic policy,
and the two must be viewed together. Thus, although defenses available against
domestic awards may also be available in international cases as violations of public
policy, this does not necessarily lead to a refusal to enforce. Numerous cases assert
the public policy defense even though it would be more appropriate under another
defense. This tactic may not be that useful. Courts generally apply the same
narrow construction and refuse the defense as a violation of public policy.
The first American court called on to interpret directly the extent of the public
policy defense was the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socigti Generale de Elndustrie du
Papier (RAKTA). 8 0 The court's analysis stands mainly for the principle that,
although the court will not enforce an award that is contrary to the public policy
of the United States, public policy is not equated with our national policy or our
national political interest.
The controversy arose when Parsons & Whittemore, a U.S. corporation,
withdrew its work crew from Egypt. The work crew had been in Egypt to
construct a paperboard mill for RAKTA, an Egyptian corporation.' 8' The
Arab-Israeli Six Day War and deteriorating U.S.-Egyptian relations prompted
Parsons & Whittemore to leave Egypt.' 82 In order to excuse its delay in
completing the project, Parsons & Whittemore invoked the "force majeure"
clause of the contract with RAKTA.' 8 3 RAKTA disagreed with this position,
to enforcement of foreign arbitrable awards has been considered the greatest single threat to the use
of arbitration in international commercial disputes."
177. U.N. ESCOR, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral
Awards § 49, U.N. Doc. E/2704 and Corr. I, E/AC.42/4/rev. I (1955).
178. Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975); Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Socidt6 Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir.
1974).
179. See generally I-XIV Y.B. Com. ARtB. (International Council for Commercial Arbitration).
180. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); accord Antco Shipping Co. v. Siderner S.p.A., 417 F. Supp.
207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
181, Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 972. Parsons & Whittemore consented by written
agreement with RAKTA to construct, to start up, and for one year, to manage and supervise a
paperboard mill.
182. Id. at 972. Many of Parsons & Whittemore's American work crew left Egypt, and thereafter,
the Egyptian government expelled all Americans except those who applied and qualified for a special
visa.
183. id. Among the terms of the contract was an arbitration clause, which provided a means to
settle disputes arising in the course of performance, and a "force majeure" clause, which excused
delay in performance due to causes beyond Parsons & Whittemore's reasonable capacity to control.
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demanded arbitration of the dispute, and ultimately obtained an arbitral award for
damages resulting from the breach of contract. 184 Parsons & Whittemore then
sought a declaratory judgment in the United States to block RAKTA from
enforcing the arbitral award. 185 The court refused to8 6 grant the judgment and
instead issued an order confirming RAKTA's award. 1
Parsons & Whittemore raised several defenses to the enforcement of the
award: one was a public policy argument. American citizens in Egypt had an
obligation to abandon the construction of the mill when U.S.-Egyptian relations
were severed. The court did not accept this interpretation of the defense: "[t]o
read the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of national
political interests would seriously undermine the Convention's utility."'' 87 The
court saw no definite guidelines from the legislative history of the New York
Convention nor any convincing arguments from the commentators. The court
drew inferences from the New York Convention as a whole and, relying on the
"general proenforcement bias" of the Convention, recognized only a "narrow
reading of the public policy defense."' 188 A decision to the contrary "would
mean converting a defense intended to be of narrow scope into a major
loophole in the Convention's mechanism for enforcement."' 89 The court
emphasized that the defense was not to be used to protect national interest, but
rather that, by acceding to the Convention, the United States was subscribing to
a supernational interest. '90 This, coupled with the fears of retaliatory use of the
public policy exception by foreign courts, led the Second Circuit to conclude:
[A]n expansive construction of this defense would violate the Convention's basic effort
to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement....
We conclude, therefore, that the Convention's public policy defense should be
construed narrowly. Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis
only where enforcement would violate theforum state's most basic notions of morality
and justice. 19'

This language is now the standard by which attempts to invoke the public
policy defense are judged. 192 The standard of "morality and justice," however,
offers little guidance.
The Supreme Court continued to distinguish between domestic public policy
and the narrower concept of international public policy in Scherk v. Alberto-

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 969.
187. Id. at 974.
188. Id. at 973.
189. Id. at 974.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 973-74 (emphasis added).
192. See, e.g., Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150,
152 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Culver Co. 193 The question in Scherk was whether to allow the arbitration of a
securities issue in an international contract despite federal statutes prohibiting the
waiver of a right to a trial in a domestic securities case. 194 Alberto-Culver, a U.S.
corporation, contracted with Scherk, a German citizen, for the transfer of business
enterprises and trademark rights held by Scherk to Alberto-Culver. 195 The sales
contract contained express warranties that the trademarks were unencumbered and
included a clause to arbitrate any claim that might arise from the transaction. 196
After the transfer, Alberto-Culver claimed it had discovered that the trademark
rights were subject to undisclosed encumbrances.' 97 Scherk refused to rescind the
contract and Alberto-Culver brought suit in a U.S. district court, alleging that
Scherk had violated U.S. securities laws. 198 Scherk sought to stay the litigation
by relying on the arbitration clause. The district and circuit courts denied Scherk's
attempt to stay litigation, 199 relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v.
Swan. 200 The Wilko decision denied enforcement of arbitration on the grounds that
the issue concerned the domestic sale of securities and that arbitration on the
question of securities transactions was against public policy.
The Supreme Court in Scherk, however, found the Wilko precedent factually
inapplicable and therefore upheld the arbitration provision. 2 0 ' The crucial
distinction between Scherk and Wilko, the Supreme Court noted, concerned the
truly international nature of "Alberto-Culver's contract to purchase the business
entities belonging to Scherk. . . . Such an international] contract involves
considerations and policies significantly different from those controlling in
Wilko. "22 Agreements to select a forum and governing law play a crucial role
in international business transactions by providing certainty for the parties.
National courts, according to the Supreme Court, should not subvert these goals,
but rather should consider the broader implications of their actions: "A parochial

193. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
194. This defense might be more appropriate under article V(2)(a). This article allows a defense
where the subject matter is not a subject that should be arbitrated. See supra notes 152-72 and
accompanying text.
195. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508.
196. Id. The arbitration clause provided that "any controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this
agreement or the breach thereof" would be referred to arbitration.
197. Id.at 509.
198. Id.The security violations were based on § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5.
199. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510.
200. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The case involved an agreement between Wilko and Hayden, Stone
& Co., a large brokerage firm, under which Wilko agreed to purchase, on margin, a number of shares
of a corporation's common stock. Wilko alleged the purchase was induced by misrepresentation and
brought a suit for damages. The defendant responded that Wilko had agreed to submit all controversies
to arbitration.
201. The court noted the Wilko suit was brought under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513. There is no statutory counterpart to § 12(2) in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 which governs the Scherk litigation.
202. Id.at 515.
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refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration
agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but also invite unseemly and
mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation
advantages.," 20 3 Finally, the Court noted that its ruling must be consistent with
the goals of the New York Convention. 20 4 Yet no clear guidelines emerged from
Scherk except, possibly, the necessity that the contract be truly "international."
The public policy defense has rarely been successful before U.S. courts
despite the variety of claims that challengers have tried to bring within its scope.
The most recent examination of the defense by the Supreme Court is in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 20 5 Mitsubishi involved the determination of whether an American court should enforce an
agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when the agreement arises
from an international transaction. 206 The controversy arose under an arbitration
agreement between a Japanese party and a U.S. party. Although the agreement
provided for arbitration of disputes in Japan, the U.S. party filed a claim in the
U.S. district court under federal antitrust laws. The First Circuit concluded that
the antitrust exception created by some circuit courts made antitrust claims
nonarbitrable. 2 °7 Finding statutory support for its conclusion, the circuit court
cited article 11(1) of the Convention, which removed such claims
from arbitration
208
since they were "not capable of settlement by arbitration."
Citing to Scherk, the first case enunciating the federal policy of interpreting the
Convention defenses restrictively, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
First Circuit and reaffirmed its strong presumption in favor of enforcement of
freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions. 20 9 The Court stated
that "[h]ere, as in Scherk, that presumption is reinforced by the emphatic federal
policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution." 2 10 Moreover, the Supreme Court
rejected arguments that antitrust claims were inappropriate for arbitration. 2 11 The
203. Id. at 516-17.
204. Id. at 520 n.15.
205. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
206. Id. at 624. Mitsubishi asserts a question on the arbitrability of the subject matter that is
properly brought under article V(2)(a). See also supra note 194.
207. Id. at 623; see, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1968); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir.
1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438
F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air
Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970).
208. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 162-66 (1st Cir.
1983).

209. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640.
210. Id. at 631.
211. See generally La Socidt6 Nat'l Pour La Recherche v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co., 585 F.
Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984). In that case a dispute arose over the
sale of crude oil. It was argued that a provision in the contract was a per se violation of the antitrust
law as an illegal location restriction on the resale of goods. The court concluded that an antitrust
violation is not an inherent violation of our public policy. 585 F. Supp. at 63. But see American
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Court concluded that "concerns of international comity, respect for the capacity
of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution
of disputes require
' 2 12
enforcement of transnational agreements to arbitrate.
Later, in Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.,213 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit again enforced an arbitration clause in an
international contract when the court probably would not have enforced the
agreement had the arbitration clause been in a purely domestic contract. In
Fotochrome the court reversed the Bankruptcy Court's stay of arbitration
proceedings. 214 The court noted that the New York Convention is silent on the
subject of bankruptcy, providing no indication of whether bankruptcy should fall
under the public policy umbrella. 2t 5 The court, stressing the strong policy in
favor of international recognition, construed the public policy defense narrowly
and adopted the Parsons & Whittemore 216 guideline of "most basic notion of
morality and justice." 217 Since the award was a valid determination on the merits
of the dispute, it was not reviewable by the Bankruptcy Court. The court
concluded that the New York Convention mandated enforcement of the foreign
award.218

The strong policy of enforcing arbitral awards has even overshadowed the
presence of inconsistent testimony to find enforcement. In Waterside Ocean
Navigation Co. v. InternationalNavigation Ltd.219 the party against whom the

arbitral awards were rendered in London, International Navigation Ltd., challenged enforcement of the award in the U.S. courts, alleging that the award was0
party. 22

based on inconsistent sworn testimony by a witness for the prevailing
International Navigation Ltd. argued that confirming the award would violate
U.S. public policy favoring the protection of the "sanctity of the oath and
maintenance of the integrity of the judicial system." 22 ' The district court rejected
International Navigation's claim and the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.2 22
The Second Circuit noted that the public policy defense "must be construed in

light of the overriding purpose of the Convention," and that the Convention's
Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), which reasons that "the
pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims that arise
in such cases, combine to make antitrust claims ... inappropriate for arbitration." Id. at 827-28.
212. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
213. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
214. Id. at520.
215. For an analysis of bankruptcy arbitration, see Note, Nonrecognition Post-Bankruptcy
Arbitration: Victrix Steamship Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 22 INT'L LAW. 1183 (1988).

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

508 F.2d at 974.
Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at513.
Id.at
516.
737 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at151.
Id.
Id. at155.
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purpose is to encourage enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 223 The court
found that "the assertion that the policy against inconsistent testimony is one 224
of
our nation's 'most basic notion[s] of morality and justice' goes much too far."
The courts have rejected the public policy defense based on the grounds that
the award was made by arbitrators with undisclosed connections to the prevailing
party.225 In FertilizerCorp v. IDI,226 IDI asserted that the arbitrator had served
as counsel for Fertilizer Corp. on at least two other occasions. 227 The court stated
that while it agreed that the preferable conduct was disclosure of the relationship,
228
it decided that the "stronger public policy. . . is that which favors arbitration."
The court, therefore, found that recognition or enforcement would not be contrary
to the public policy of the United States, and enforcement may not be denied on
this basis. 229 The courts have held that nondisclosure does not taint the award so
as to deny enforcement.
An open question remains as to whether one can invoke the public policy
defense to block enforcement of awards obtained by fraud. In Biotronik
230
Mess-und TherapiegeraeteGmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co.
a federal district court confronted the question of whether the defense of fraud
applied to the New York Convention under U.S. law. The court found that the
alleged conduct did not constitute fraud and expressly declined to answer the
question presented. 23 1 The Second Circuit in Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v.
InternationalNavigation, Ltd., however, summarily dismissed a claim that fraud
violated U.S. public policy and that evidence of fraud barred enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention.2 32 The court rejected the
defense of inconsistent testimony and stressed the narrow scope of the public
policy defense.233 Thus, the question of whether U.S. courts will recognize
fraud as a valid public policy defense has not been definitively answered.
Dictum in Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co.,
A.G. 234 suggests that if an agreement to arbitrate is secured under duress, a U.S.
court may recognize another exception to the general proenforcement policy and
refuse to enforce the award. The court stated that "[a]greements exacted by
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 152.
Id.
See also Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976).
517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
Id. at 953.
Id. at 954-55.
Id. at 955.
Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415

F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976). Medford argued that the failure of the successful party to enter into
evidence any information about the alleged agreement said to affect the claim constituted fraud. Id.
at 140.
231. Id. at 140.
232. 737 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir, 1984).
233. Id. at 151-52.
234. 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y.1979).
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duress contravene the public policy of the nation,235 . . . and accordingly duress,
if established, furnishes a basis for refusing enforcement of an award under
article V(2)(b) of the Convention." 236 This principle is not a binding interpretation on the Convention since the court that made the statement did not find
duress in the making of the agreement and confirmed the award. 237
In Transmarinea second public policy violation was asserted. In this argument,
Marc Rich reiterated an objection it raised at the arbitration hearing, that the
presence of one of the arbitrators on the panel was improper. 238 Marc Rich
disclaimed any specific allegations of bias, but did object to an appearance of
bias. 239 The court found no appearance of bias since the relationship in question
was "far too tenuous

. . .

to require the disqualification of an experienced and

respected maritime arbitrator, particularly
where Rich offers no challenge to [the
' 24
arbitrator's] personal integrity. 0
The article V public policy defense has been partly successful, however, in at
least one U.S. court, in Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableriesde Lens, S.A. [LTCL] v.
Southwire Co. 24 1 That case involved a purchase agreement for steel wire between
a French seller, LTCL, and an American buyer, Southwire, both of whom were
bound by an arbitration clause and a clause providing that the agreement would
be governed by the laws of Georgia to the extent that they did not conflict with
the laws of France. 242 When a dispute arose over the price to be paid by
Southwire, the issue was arbitrated according to the terms of the agreement, and
an award was made in favor of LTCL. 24 3 The arbitration panel, relying on French

235. Id. at 358
236. Id.; cf. Flour Western, Inc. v. G & H Offshore Towing Co., 447 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 197 1),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1971).
237. Transmarine, 480 F. Supp. at 359-61. Rich alleged economic duress since Transmarine
breached the contract and Rich had no choice but to agree to Transmarine's terms. The court
concluded that Rich merely exercised its business judgment and that such does not constitute duress.
238. Id. at 357. Although this type of public policy violation has been asserted in other cases,
e.g., Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981), it might be
more appropriately asserted under article V(l)(d). This article allows a defense where the
composition of the arbitral body is not in accord with the parties' agreement or applicable law. See
supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text. Rich placed reliance upon Commonwealth Coating
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Corp., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
239. Transmarine, 480 F. Supp. at 356. Rich bases this defense upon the fact that the arbitrator
in question was president and chief operating officer of a corporation that had pursued a claim against
Rich in arbitration and then in federal courts. See Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich
& Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978) (court decided specifically that awards should not be
vacated because of an appearance of bias).
240. Transmarine, 480 F. Supp. at 357-58. The court suggests that the only grounds for
disqualification of an arbitrator is a direct financial relationship between the arbitrator and a party to
the arbitration.
241. 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
242. Id. at 1065.
243. Id. at 1065-66. In the agreement the price to be paid was to be determined according to a
formula based on the world market price of steel. A dispute arose as to the interpretation of the world
market price adjustment clause.
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law, awarded LTCL interest on payments due.244 The initial rates were 101/2
percent and 91/ percent, respectively, and were increased to 151/2 percent and
141/2 percent, respectively, two months after the notification of the award. 245
These rates were selected as the maximum rates permissible under French law.
During enforcement proceedings in U.S. federal court, Southwire invoked
article V(2)(b) of the Convention, arguing against enforceability of the award
because the rates were usurious and against public policy.246 The court found the
initial rates acceptable, even though higher than Georgia law generally
allowed. 247 In upholding enforcement of the award, the court observed that the
United States "cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on [its] terms, governed by [its] laws, and resolved in
[its] courts." 248 Separately analyzing the issue of escalated interest, however, the
court concluded that the interest rates did not reflect actual damages. Instead,
they constituted a penalty, which U.S. law disfavors. 249 Citing article V(2)(b),
the court refused to enforce the escalated interest rates on the award.25 °
Unfortunately, these cases illustrate that the courts' articulated standards for
evaluating article V(b)(2) public policy defenses are vague and subjective. The
public policy defense must be construed in light of the overriding purpose of the
Convention, which is "to encourage the recognition and enforcement of
commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are
enforced in the signatory countries. ' 25' The courts have unequivocally stated
that the public policy defense should be construed narrowly. The defense should
apply only where enforcement would violate our "most basic notions of morality
252
and justice."
III. Proenforcement Attitude
Courts in the United States pursue a consistent, well-articulated policy of
recognizing and enforcing awards rendered in both domestic and foreign
arbitration. 253 The same fundamental policies motivating U.S. courts to enforce
244. Id. at 1067.
245. Id. at 1068.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1069.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. ld.
251. See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15; see also Waterside, 737 F.2d at 152; Bergesen v.
Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 933 (2d Cir. 1983); Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516; Parsons &
Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 973.
252. See Fotochrome, 517 F. 2d at 516; Parsons& Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974.
253. Holtzmann, National Report-United States, [1977] 11Y.B. COM. ARB. 116, 138; see also
Hoellering, Arbitration in the United States, in 1977 ARBITRATION & THE LAW 124. "The [U.S.]
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
VOL, 24, NO. 2

UN CONVENTION OF 1958: "REFUSAL" PROVISIONS

517

agreements to arbitrate also motivate courts to recognize and enforce foreign
arbitral awards. 254 United States courts consistently uphold the arbitral process
because it offers many attractive features not generally available to parties
litigating through the court system. While the majority of arbitral awards are
satisfied through voluntary compliance of the parties involved, 255 on some
occasions a party must invoke external authority to enforce a losing party's
obligation and collect the damages awarded. 256 The proenforcement policy is
grounded in the New York Convention.
The United States Supreme Court leaves no doubt that the goals of the New
York Convention, and the principle purpose underlying American adoption and
implementation of it, is to encourage the recognition and enforcement of
commercial arbitration agreements and international contracts and to unify the
standards by which the agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards
are enforced.2 57 The goal of the New York Convention is a summary procedure
to expedite the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 258 There is a
strong policy in the U.S. courts favoring arbitration, especially in the context of
international agreements. Arbitration clauses are to be liberally construed. 259
Moreover, any doubts as to whether an arbitration clause may be interpreted to
cover the asserted dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration. 260 Given the
narrow construction and interpretation of the defenses allowed under the New
York Convention, arbitral awards are supported by a proenforcement attitude.
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1.24-25 (1983). See generally Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 605 (1985);
Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985); Becker
Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1978); Fotochrome,
517 F.2d at 512 (2d Cir. 1975); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Chemtex Fibers, Inc., 617
F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V., 609 F. Supp.
75 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Rogers, Burgun, Shahine and Deschler, Inc. v. Dongsan Constr. Co., 598 F.
Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); La Socidt6 Nat'l Pour La Recherche v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co.,
585 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984); Fuller Co. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinfe, 421 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
254. An example of the favorable attitude with which U.S. courts view arbitration is Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). In Dean Witter, the United States Supreme Court
resolved a split among the circuits concerning the arbitrability of pending state claims that arise out
of the same transaction and are sufficiently related factually and legally to federal nonarbitrable
claims. The Court concurred with opinions of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that the Federal
Arbitration Act, "both through its plain meaning and the strong federal policy it reflects, requires
courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate, and 'not substitute [its] own views of
economy and efficiency' for those of Congress." Id. at 217 (citing Dickinson v. Heinold Securities,
Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1981)).
255. M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 36:01 (rev. ed. 1988).
256. "An essential element in a successful international .. . system of effective commercial
arbitration is the ease and efficiency with which awards are enforced." Id.§ 46:00.
257. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517 n.10.
258. See Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1976).
259. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395.
260. Hussey Metal Div. of Copper Range Co. v. Lectromelt Furnace Div., McGraw-Edison Co.,
471 F.2d 556, 558 (3d Cir. 1972).
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IV. Conclusion
Parties contract to arbitrate disputes in order to avoid litigation and maintain
superior commercial relations with their business counterparts. For the most
part, arbitral awards are satisfied voluntarily. Nevertheless, parties must be
confident that, if necessary, means will be available to enforce arbitral awards.
The history of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York
Convention provides that assurance.
The proenforcement policy of the U.S. courts is consistently applied. Courts
in the United States pursue a consistent, well-articulated policy of recognizing
and enforcing awards rendered in arbitration. In short, in the absence of
compelling defensive arguments justifying a contrary result, the U.S. courts will
actively support the rights of parties to choose arbitration as a means for dispute
settlement and to have the results of arbitral proceedings enforced without
extensive judicial review. The U.S. courts will continue to limit the grounds for
refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards. If there is any flexibility in the refusal
defenses it is found in the public policy defense. Article V(2)(b), however, is
quickly being defined. Refusal is only guaranteed if there is a significant showing
of corruption or fraud; otherwise, awards will be enforced.

VOL. 24, NO. 2

